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Brief 
Case No. 
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This appeal is from the order of the district court 
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2 
dismissing the complaint for failure to state a cause of 
action (Tr. 32) following the election of appellants to 
stand on their complaint upon sustaining of a demur-
rer thereto. The demurrer (Tr. 26) was based on a fail-
ure to state a cause of action o'r state a case for injunc-
tive relief. The order sustaining the demurrer ('Tr. 32) 
denied the right to amend the complaint and ordered a 
dismissal thereof, thus indicating that the ruling of the 
court was for failure to state a cause of action for any 
relief whatever. It will therefore he assumed that the 
complaint stated grounds for equitable relief but that it 
failed to state a cause of action entitling appellants to 
any re'lief whatever. 
By stipulation and order the complaint was sub-
sequently amended in minor details and the order of the 
court was made applicable to the complaint as amend-
ed by interlineation (Tr. 31). 
Since the appeal is on the judgment roll there is 
no transcript of evidence and no statement of the 
court's reasons for sustaining the den1urrer of the res-
pondent. The complaint alleges that the action of res-
pondent was taken \vithout evidence, without finding, 
without reasonable support, and that it \Vas not promo-
tive of the public health, safety, morals, or we'lfare of 
Salt Lake City or its people by alleging that none of 
those interests would be promoted by the action of the 
respondent. 
There follow the complaint as amended, without the 
title and verification (Tr. 1), and Exhibits "A", "B'', 
and "D" attached to the complaint (Tr. 11, 13, 16). Ex-
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3 
hibi ts " C" and "E ' ' ('Tr. 13, 17) are not reproduced as 
they will be referred to only generally in the argument 
herein. 
" For their cause of action plaintiffs allege : 
1. Plaintiffs, I. R. Stringham; J. S. Smith; J. D. 
Gardner; Central Land ·Company, a corporation; Utah 
Motor Park, a corporation; Iva Parkin; E .F. Zeyer; L. 
0. Hunter; Art J. Carter; Fred Muse; Ivy Rae Pit-
man~ E. A. C:Q.amberlin; Frank B. Bowers; Mrs. Dean R. 
Daynes ~ Mrs. Hugh W. Law; and Kenneth E. Smith, are 
owners or operators of motor courts in Salt Lake City, 
Utah, which motor courts offer lodging accommodations 
to visitors, to transient persons, and to residents of Salt 
Lake City, usually on a daily or weekly basis. 
2. Plaintiffs, Glen C. Bills; Albert P. ~olt; Lewis 
Humphries; Gomer 0. Thomas; Utah Credit Co., a cor-
poration; Capitol Chevrotet Co., a corporation; Home 
Acceptance Corp., a corporation; and Joe Johnson, are 
owners or opera tors of service stations or other facili-
ties servicing or relating to motor cars and situated in' 
Salt Lake County, Utah. 
3. The defendant is a municipal corporation exist-
ing under the laws of the State of Utah and situated in 
Salt I_jake County, Utah; and corporate plaintiffs are 
corporations of the State of Utah. 
4. Each of the plaintiffs is the owner of a sign or 
signs advertising the business of such plaintiff and in-
viting patronage of said business from members of the 
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public who travel upon and use the streets of Salt Lake 
City, and each of said signs is situated upon that portion 
of the public streets known as the curbing or parking 
area lying and being between the curb or edge of the por-
tion of the street used for vehicular traffic and the side-
walk or th-e portion used for pedestrian traffic, and each 
of said signs is mounted upon a support which is af-
fixed to or rests upon said portion of the public street. 
None of said signs protrudes over or is above any por-
tion of any public street which is customarily used by 
pedestrians for walking, by vehicular traffic for travel 
or movement, or by any other group of persons except 
these plaintiffs, who care for the lawn, flowers, shrubs~ 
and trees in said parking areas and service said signs 
as and when service is needed. 
5. All of the aforementioned signs were constructed 
after obtaining, and pursuant to, permits issued by the 
defendant upon application of the plaintiffs and pur-
suant to Section 5720 of the Revised Ordinances of Salt 
Lake 'City, Utah, 1944, copy of which is marked Exhibit 
"A," attached hereto, and by this reference made a part 
hereof. Plaintiffs have information which they believe 
and therefore allege as the fact that no objections have 
been made to the existence of the aforesaid signs for 
any reasons of. health, safety, mora:ls, general welfare, 
unsightliness, nuisance, or as being contrary to the best 
interests of the public residing within Salt Lake City, 
and the only objection against said signs which is known 
to P'laintiffs is that an official of the Road Commission 
of the State of Utah is reported to have said that there 
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5 
should be no signs on any state highways in the State of 
Utah, ""hich objection would be applicable to a part only 
of the signs owned by plaintiffs, namely, to those signs 
situated on streets of Salt Lake City which are also des-
ignated as state highways. This alleged objection of an 
officia:l of the Road Commission would be applicable to 
a great number of overhanging signs, marquees, and pre-
sumably to obstructions and encroachments on and under 
the sidewalks of streets of ,Salt Lake City which are des-
ignated as state highways, none of which said signs and 
other structures and obstructions are affected by the 
revision of Exhibit ''A,'' hereinabove referred to and 
none of which defendant is endeavoring to curtail or 
prohibit. 
6. T"rice during the year 1947 officials of the de-
fendant notified groups of the plaintiffs that signs on 
parking or curb areas of the streets of defendant city 
should be removed and that permits for a continued use 
of said signs would not be renewed. 
7. At the request of plaintiffs named in paragraph 
1 hereof the Board of Commissioners of defendant gave 
notice of a hearing relative to promulgation of an ordin-
ance designed to amend Section 5720 of the Revised Or-
dinances of Salt Lake City, 1944, which notice is at-
tached hereto as Exhibit '' B '' and by this reference 
made a part hereof. 
8. Pursuant to Exhibit "B," representatives of the 
plaintiffs named in paragraph 1 appeared before the said 
Board of Commissioners and voiced objections to the 
propofoied revision of the ordinance aforesaid for the 
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reason that such revision would he discriminatory, con-
trary to the best interests of the residents of Salt Lake 
City, and not pursuant to any of the authority vested 
in the Board of Commissioners of defendant. At said 
hearing no person appeared in support of the revision 
of said ordinance and the said Board of Commissioners 
indicated no request from residents of Salt Lake City, 
Utah, for such a revision and indicated no reason of 
public net~d or policy requiring or permitting the pro-
posed revision of said ordinance, except that said Board 
of Commis~Sioners had long considered the advisability 
of withdra\ving licenses for signs for such as those 
owned by plaintiffs, as aforesaid, and that it would 
be a good thing if such a revision were made and said 
signs removed, and also that a representative of the 
Road Commission of the State of Utah had mentioned 
that no signs, including some of the signs of plaintiffs, 
should he allo\\red to exist on or over the public high-
ways of the Stat~ of Utah. 
9. Despite the objections of these plaintiffs, voiced 
as aforesaid, and the lack of any public or private sup-
port for a revision of said ordinance in the manner 
threatened, the Bonrd of Commissioners of Salt Lake 
City has purported to pass and promulgate a revised 
ordinance No. 5720 nf Salt I...~ake City, Utah, a copy of 
which is attached hereto as Exhibit "C" and by this 
reference made a part hereof. 
10. At the hearing aforesaid no evidence \vas giv-
en and no reason or authority except as stated herein-
before for changing signs situated in, on, or over the 
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city property from ''structures'' to ''obstructions'' sim-
ply by rewording an ordinance, as has been attempted 
by the defendant acting by its duly e'lected Board of City 
Commissioners. 
11. Exhibit '' C '' is beyond and in excess of any 
lawful authority vested in the said Board of Commis-
sioners of defen~ant and is discriminatory, unlawful, 
unreasonable, and void as being unrelated to any legi-
timate object of the defendant city, as is more fully 
sho'vn by the following facts : 
(a) The said signs of plaintiffs are not such ob ... 
structions as to require p~rohibition or as to permit of 
discriminatory prohibition or regulation for the reason 
that the said parking areas throughout Salt Lake City 
and outside of the congested district are planted with 
trees, which trees are much more of an obstruction of 
view and an interference with the safe use of streets 
than are said signs; the streets of Salt Lake City have 
placed in said parking areas numerous uti'lity pole.s, 
which said poles are more unsightly and are greater ob-
structions to the safe use of said streets than are the signs 
of plaintiffs; there are over and above the streets of 
Salt Lake City, and particularly in the congested por-
tion of said city, numerous overhanging signs and ad-
vertisements, some of which are affixed and attached to 
buildings and others of which are not, a~d which extend 
and protrude over and above the streets of said city, 
which said signs are more dangerous to the safe use of 
the streets and particularly the side,valks thereof than 
are the signs of plaintiffs and which said signs are 
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greater obstructions to the free and safe use of said 
streets than are the signs of plaintiffs; and none of the 
aforesaid uses, structures, and obstructions are prohi-
bited by the ordinances of Salt Lake City, and the afore-
mentioned signs are specifically permitted under Section 
5731, shade trees by Section 4315, and poles by Sections 
6001, 6002, 6005, and ·6006 of the Revised Ordinances of 
Salt Lake City, Utah, 1944. 
(b) Said signs of plaintiffs do not encroach upon 
the use of the streets of Salt Lake City for the reason 
that said signs do not extend over any of the traveled 
portions of said streets or over any of the portions used 
by pedestrjans; and there are many other uses of said 
streets which are permitted by Salt Lake City and which 
constitute encroachments upon said uses and, more par-
ticularly: Innumerable trees; hanging signs, as above 
mentioned, and other advertisements ; delivery chutes, 
elevators, and receptacles placed in the sidewalks of said 
streets at innumerable places and, particularly, in the 
congested areas; and portions excavated under the side-
walks in the congested areas and used for business pur-
poses by the abutting owners. 
(c) Prohibition of the signs of plaintiffs cannot be 
related to traffic control because most of said signs are 
in areas where trees have been planted in the parking 
areas, and placing the signs back from the street onto 
private property would be a greater traffic hazard than 
having them where located; furthermore, overhanging 
signs permitted throughout Salt Lake City nre equally 
distracting and ·because greater in number, are more dis-
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tracting to traffic and are, therefore, a greater danger 
and hazard than are the signs of plaintiffs; furthermore, 
the regulations and the enforcement policies enacted and 
in effect by the defendant permit advertising signs on 
utility buses, on delivery trucks, and on sound trucks 
and permit the use of sound trucks over and along the 
streets of Salt Lake City, all of which attract the atten-
tion of drivers of vehicles on the public streets and con-
stitute a greater traffic hazard than do the signs of 
these plaintiffs, none of which uses is p·rohibited as is 
attempted by the ordinance here in question. 
(d) The said ordinance is unreasonable as a safety 
regulation since the signs of these plaintiffs are soundly 
constructed of non-combustible materials, are not above 
the traveled portions of the streets or sidewalks and are, 
therefore, less dangerous to the traveling and walking 
public and less dangerous as a fire hazard than are the 
permitted overhead signs, -utility wires, guy wires, trees, 
and the above-mentioned delivery chutes, elevators, re-
ceptaeles, and similar obstructions and encroachments 
placed in the sidewalks. 
(e) Said regulation is not reasonable as motivated 
by aesthetic considerations because said signs of plain-
tiffs are attractive and well-kept and are not less at-
tractive than are other signs p-ermitted to be over the 
stre-ets by said defendant and are more attractive than 
uses permitted by private property owners, including the 
display of unattractive signs and the construction and 
n1aintenance of barns, sheds, garages, and commercial 
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plants in the areas where the s1gns of plaintiffs are 
maintained. 
(f) Said regulation is unrelated to health of the 
·people of 'Salt Lake City, there being nothing injurious, 
noxious, or deieterious about the signs of plaintiffs. 
(g) Said signs of plaintiffs are not fire hazards 
and are not susceptible to regulation as fire hazards for 
the reason that s::tid signs are not in sufficiently close 
proximity to buildings or residences, and for the further 
reason that said signs are made of non-combustible ma-
terials of good construction with a low voltage of elec-
tricity, for the further reason that said signs meet all of 
the requirements of said defendant for electrical con-
struction and are therefore not a fire hazard or other-
wise dangerous. 
(h) Said signs of plaintiffs are unrelated to the 
morals of Sa'lt Lake City and are not injurious to morals 
because the copy on said signs advertiRP.S motor court:;; 
and automobile services or automobiles in a clean, whole-· 
some, business-like manner. 
( i) Regulations of said signs is not justified be-
cause of congestion in Salt Lake City for the reason 
that most of said signs are located outside the busines~ 
or congested area, in which area innumerable hanging 
signs and other advertising structures are permitted by 
the defendant. 
(j) Regulation of said signs is not supportable as 
an interference with residential uses of the property in 
Salt Lake City for the reasons that said ordinance makes 
no effort to regulate use of the abutting property, there 
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have been no complaints of the signs of plaintiffs be-
cause of such interference, and because some of said 
signs exist in commercial and business districts as well 
as in residential districts; and said ordinance makes no 
reference to use of the property abutting the signs. 
12. This action is brought in behalf of all persons 
situated similarly to . plaintiffs or any of them, which 
persons may join as plaintiffs in this cause or have the 
benefit of this proceeding without joining. 
13. Plaintiffs have constructed the aforesaid signs 
pursuant to permission of defendant at great expense. 
1-±. Defendant has given notice to plaintiffs and to 
all of them that their existing signs must be removed 
on or before February 15, 1948, and that unless so re-
moved the defendant will take action against each plain-
tiff for removal of said signs. 
15. Permitting the maintenance of this action and 
issuance of an injunction against the defendant's en-
forcing said revised ordinance witl avoid a multiplicity 
of suits. 
16. Unless an injunction issues against defendant's 
enforcing Revised Ordinance, marked Exhibit '' C,'' 
plaintiffs will suffer great and irreparable injury in that 
if the signs of the plaintiffs are removed defendant will 
not permit their replacement and these plaintiffs have 
no remedy by law to compel defendant to permit the re-
erection of said signs should they be taken down and 
new and original application be made for a permit under 
a discretionary ordinance. 
17. Plaintiffs have offered to pay the annual li-
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cense fees for 1948 required for the continued existence 
of said signs, which fees defendant has refused to accept 
solely upon the ground that the revised ordinance does 
not permit continued existence of said signs and not for 
any reason of hazard, obstruction of traffic, encroach-
ment upon property of the city, lack of beauty or at-
tractiveness, or acceptability of the copy on said signs 
or the appearance thereof, or for failure to maintain said 
signs in a safe and adequate manner, and plaintiffs fur-
ther allege that none of said potential objections exists 
as to any of said signs. 
18. The Deputy City Recorder of defendant has 
furnished information which plaintiffs believe and there-
fore allege as the fact that the latest official finding, 
order, or action taken by defendant with reference to 
Exhibit '' C'' and the ordered removal of plaintiffs' 
signs, was taken on January 6, 1948, as shown by the 
document on file in the City Recorder's office, of which 
a copy is attached hereto as Exhibit "D" and by this 
reference made a· part hereof; and plaintiffs further 
allege that the said amended Ordinance 5720, referred 
to as Exhibit '' C, '' has not been duly and officially sign-
ed or published by defendant's officers and that the 
threatened action of defendant above referred to is for 
this further reason arbitrary, discriminatory, unr~ason­
ahle, and void. 
19. Plaintiffs further allege that, should this Hon-
orable Court find that Exhibit '' C'' has not been enact-
ed by defendant and that the action of defendant refer-
red to in paragraph 14 is taken pursuant to Ordinance 
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5720 referred to as Exhibit "A," then plaintiffs allege 
that said action is unlawful, discriminatory, unreason-
able, and void for ali of the reasons alleged in para-
graphs 11 and 18 and for the additional reason that sub-
section •· g" of said Exhibit "A" is unlawful, unrea-
sonable, discriminatory, and void and does not contain 
or indicate any standard or standards to govern the re-
moval of structures erected pursuant to permission con-
tained in said Section 5720 permitting defendant to act 
arbitrarily and capriciously as defendant is doing in the 
matters alleged herein, thereby damaging and threat-
ening to damage plaintiffs as aforesaid and discrimin-
ating against plaintiffs. in resp·ect to their signs refer-
red to herein as against other signs and other structures 
erected above, over, in, or around any part of any 
street of Salt Lake City pursuant to Section 5731, Re-
vised O-rdinances of Salt Lake ·City, Utah, 1944, copy of 
which is attached hereto as Exhibit '' E'' and incorpor-
ated herein, which section does not provide for arbitrary 
or discriminatory r-emoval unless and until said signs 
sha'll become unsafe or dangerous, and defendant has· 
made no finding, order, or determination in the prem-
ises except as shown by Exhibit ''D.'' 
WHEREFORE, plaintiffs pray that this court issue 
a restraining order against the defendant and its offi-
cers, agents. employees, and attorneys restraining it and 
them from enforcing. Revised Ordinance 5720, attached 
to this complaint as Exhibit '' C,'' and that this court 
issue an order to defendant to show cause on a day cer-
tain ,vhy an injunction should not issue against the de-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
14 
fendant and its officers, agents, employees, and attor-
neys enjoining the enforcement of said ordinance pend-
ing final determination of this proceeding by this court, 
and that a bond be fixed in such form and amount as to 
indemnify defendant against damage from said injunc-
tion; 
And plaintiffs pray further for a permanent injunc-
tion against the defendant enjoining the enforcement of 
said Revised Ordinance '5720, for such further relief as 
shall he appropriate to protect and preserve the rights 
and p;roperty of plaintiffs, and for their costs incurred 
herein. 
" 
(Signed) RICHARD·S AND BIRD, 
Attorneys fo-r PZamtiffs." 
Exhibit ''A'' 
SE:C. 5720. Obstructions. Permits. Fees. The follow-
ing words when used in this ordinance shall have the 
meanings respectively ascribed to them: 
(a) "S TREE·T. "- All parts of a public 
street between the boundary lines, including park-
ings, sidewalks, gutters, and roadways. 
(b) "OBSTRUCTION." Any rub his h, 
glass, material, wood, ashes, tacks, metal, earth, 
stone or other object, thing or substance which 
may interfere _with or obstruct the free use or 
view of the street by travelers, or injure or tend 
to injure or destroy or render unsightly the sur-
face of a street, or which may cause or tend to 
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c.ause such street to become unsafe or dangerous 
for travelers thereon. 
(c) ~~STRUCTURE.'' Any sign, sign post, 
advertisen1ent, merchandise, material, flag, ban-
ner, rack, fence, vehicle, object or structure 'vhich 
shall be erected, located, deposited or placed in or 
upon any street, except those objects affixed to 
any building and extending over a street which 
are licensed or regulated under Section 5731 of 
the Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake City, Utah, 
1944. 
(d) It shall be unlawful for any person to 
-place, cast, deposit, permit or suffer to remain in 
or upon any street in Salt Lake City any obstruc-
tion as herein defined. 
(e) It shall be unlawful for any person to 
erect or place upon any street or to suffer or per-
mit to remain on any street any structure as here-
in defined without first obtaining from the Board 
of Commissioners of Salt Lake City permission 
so to do, and then only in strict accordance with 
the tern1s and conditions of the express p·ermis-
sion granted. The Board of Commissioners of 
said city may grant or deny such permission or 
imposed additional conditions wmen it deems it to 
the best interests of said city in regulating the 
use of its streets and may when it deems it ne-
cessary require that a surety bond in any rea-
sonable amount BE POSTED AND MAINTAIN-
ED. The sum of $25.00 shall be charged and col-
lected annually from every person to whom such 
permission is granted, to cover the cost of the 
regulation and inspection of any structures erect-
ed or maintained in any street. 
(f) Every application for permission to 
place a structure upon any street in said city 
shall be accompanied by the fee required for one 
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year, together with plans and specifications of 
the same, and shall state the name and address of 
the appticant, the place proposed to erect such 
structure, the length of time it is proposed to 
maintain the same and such other information as 
the Board of Commissioners may require. 
(g) All permits granted by Salt Lake City 
may be revoked, altered, or modified by said city 
at the will of the Board of Commissioners thereof 
whenever said b-o,ard shall deem it t:o be to the 
best interests of such city, and it shall he unlaw 4 
ful for any person to fail to comply with any 
order or condition imposed by said city. Every 
structure or obstruction maintained upon any 
street of said city in violation of this section is 
hereby declared to be a nuisance and it shaU be 
the duty of the police department and such other 
officers and employees of said city as said de-
partment may call upon to forthwith remove the 
same. 
Litter in streets. 15-8-24, U.C.A. 1943. 
Garbage in streets. 15-8-23, 61, U.C.A. 1943. 
Offensive liquid or refuse in streets. Sec. 1123 '' 
" Exhibit '' B'' 
NO·TICE OF HEARING 
NO:TICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that on 
Thursday, December 18th, 1947, at 11 o'clock a. 
m., in Room 302 City and County Building, a pub-
lic hearing will be held before the Board of Com-
missioners on request of J. E. Christie and others 
on proposed ordinance amending or concerning 
Section 5720 of the Revised Ordinances of Salt 
Lake City, Utah, 1944, 'vhich by its ter1ns prohibit 
signs of motor lodge operators upon ·City proper-
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ty, or in any manner affect the use of said signs . 
.. A.ll persons interested and present at said 
meeting will be given an opportunity to be heard 
in this matter. 
By order of the Board of Commissioners of 
Salt Lake City, Utah, November 25th, 1947. 
" 
IRMA F. BITNER, 
City Recorder. 
First Publication December 3d, 1947. 
Last Publication December 5th, 1947. " 
''Exhibit ''·D'' 
Salt Lake City, Utah, Jan. 6, 1948. 
I move that Petition No. 1079 of '47 of J. E. 
Christie, et al., be filed and petitioner notified 
that the Bureau of Mechanical Inspection has 
been instructed to notify all owners of advertis-
ing signs and other obstructions now in City 
parking, to remove them immediately and that 
suitable action be taken to make the amendment 
to the City ordinance effective. 
EARL J. GLADE 
Chairman Committee of the Whole. 
RQL.L CALL 
AYE NAY 
Voting X 
Affleck X 
Matheson X 
Romney X 
Tedesco X 
Mr. Chairman X 
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Passed by the Board of Commissioners of 
Salt Lake City, Utah, Jan. 6, 1948. 
IRMA F. BI'TNER, 
City Recorder. 
EARL J. GLADE, 
Mayor. 
STATEMEN'T OF APPELLANTS' ·CASE 
" 
·S'tatutes of the State of Utah (15-8-11, 23, 26, U.C. 
A., 1943) delegate to cities control over the streets with-
in their territorial 'limits, authorizing the cities either 
to regulate or prohibit use of the streets and sidewalks 
for signs and signposts or for obstructions and en-
croachments. Since Section 15-8-26 refers specin~:1lln to 
signs and signposts, that is presumably the section under 
which this case falls, although Exhibit "A" indicates 
an effort of the city to regulate curb signs under Section 
15-8-11 as an obstruction or an encroachment. In either 
event, the authority is to regulate or prohibit. 
Appellants concede that the respondent could pro-
hibit the placing of any sign on or over the streets and 
sidewalks of Salt Lake ·City. Appellants concede that 
respondent could order the removal of present signs and 
thereafter .prohibit the placing of any and all signs on 
or over the streets and sidewalks of Salt I_jake City. But 
if some signs are to be a1lowed to remain it. is the posi-
tion of appellants that the line of distinction between the 
signs to remain and signs to be removed must be ·rea-
sonable, based upon regulation which is reasonable and 
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based on a classification designed to p·romote interests 
of Salt Lake City· as to which the Board of Commission-
ers has authority. This is the ultimate question appell-
ants sought to raise in the district court on ·the merits 
of their case. The ruling on the demurrer necessarily 
holds that regardless of the evidence in support of ap-
pellants' allegations the action of the respondent is not 
revie"\\~a ble or open to question . 
... A.ntecedent to the ultimate question of the city's 
authority appellants present certain procedural prob-
lems which the respondent should have met before com-
pelling the appellants to resort to legal action and which 
should now be met by this court before the ultimate ques-
tion of the city's authority need be examined. 
Appellants contend that the action intended by the 
Board of Commissioners of respondent (hereinafter call-
ed Commissioners) was an amendment of Exhibit ''A'' 
to the complaint which would have made all curb signs 
obstructions and automatically have compelled their re-
moval and that the direction contained in Exhibit ''D'' 
to remove signs was premature until the ordinance was 
amended and was solely in anticipation of that amend-
ment which was never completed. Appelllants further con-
tend that the language of the ordinance which is Exhibit 
''A'' contemplates a determination or finding by the 
respondent before any sign is ordered removed, which 
is entirely lacking in this case. Beyo_nd that, and assum-
ing that no finding or determination must be made or 
evidence taken before ordering a removal, there is still 
the right to show that the ordered removal is arbitrary, 
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capricious, and discriminatory, which right appellants 
have been denied by the order sustaining the demurrer. 
And finally, appellants contend that the ordinance which 
is Exhibit ''A'' is void insofar as its provisions for the 
removal of a sign are concerned because it contains no 
standard or rule to guide the respondent or members of 
the public, such as appellants, and therefore permits ar-
bitrary, capricious, and discriminatory action by the 
Commissioners without restraint or right of review or 
obligation of consistency. 
'This argument is advanced under four points. 
POINTS OF APPELLANTS' ARGUMENT 
I. No present order of the respondent requires that 
appellants remove their signs. 
II. Assuming that respondent made an order, then 
because the order was made without a finding or deter-
mination and in the absence of evidence of reason or 
need the order was void and cannot be deemed to be in 
the best interest of Salt Lake ·City. 
III. Assuming that no finding, determination, or 
consideration of evidence must precede is~uance of an 
order of remov~l, then th·e order is still arbitrary, capri-
cious, and void because not support8d by any reason, 
logic, lawful classification, or legitimate objective. 
IV. Section 5720, Revised Ordinance~ of Salt Lake 
City, 1944, is void because it contains no standard or 
rule to guide the Commissioners or the public in the 
matter of removal of licensed signs. 
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I. NO PRESENT ORDER OF THE RESPONDENT 
REQUIRES TH~L\.T APPELLANTS REMOVE 
THEIR SIGNS. 
Paragraph 18 of the comp'laint alleges that the lat-
est official action taken by the respondent with reference 
to the matters involved in this action was taken on Jan-
uary 6, 1948, "~hen the resolution attached as Exhibit 
''D'' was made. This resolution plainly contemplates 
that the removal of the signs is to be concomitant with 
the effectiveness of the amended ordinance, which is al-
leged as Exhibit ''C.'' ·There is no authorization for the 
removal of the signs apart from the amendment of the 
ordinance and no intimation that the action of removal 
was to be taken independently of the amendment. 
This conclusion is borne out by Exhibit ''B,'' which 
is a notice of hearing on the proposed ordinance to 
amend Section 5720 of the Revised O-rdinances. And ac-
cording to the allegations of the complaint no other ac-
tion was before the Commissioners and there was no 
basis for any action independent of the amendment of 
the ordinance. 
It therefore appears that until the amended ordin-
ance has been passed appellants are not required by the 
respondent to move their signs. If and when an order to 
that effect has been authorized by the respondent will 
be time enough to consider the validity of the action. 
It must be borne in mind that Exhibit "D'' directed 
the Bureau of Mechanical Inspection to notify all own-
ers of "advertising signs and other obstructions now in 
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city parking" to remove them. Under the original Sec-
tion 5720 (Exhibit "A") an advertising sign was not 
an ''obstruction'' but a ''structure'' under Subsection 
(c) and it would he grammatically and logically incorrect 
for the Commissioners to refer in Exhibit '' D'' to ''ad-
vertising signs and other obstructions. ' ' That language 
becomes apt only on the assumption that the amended 
~ection 57·20 was to be placed in effect since under that 
amendment, which is Exhibit "C,'' advertising signs 
such as those involved in this suit were made "obstruc-
tions." Plainly, the intent was to amend the ordinance 
and then remove signs which would have become ''ob-
structions.'' 
II. ASSUMING THAT RESPONDENT MADE AN 
ORDER, THEN BE'CAUSE THE ORDER WAS 
MADE WITHOUT A FINDING OR DE'TERMIN-_ 
ATION AND IN ·THE ABSENCE OF EVIDENCE 
OF REASON OR NEED THE OR.DER WAS 
VOID AND CANNOT BE DEEMED TO BE IN 
THE BEST INTEREST OF SALT LAKE CITY. 
The argument under this point assumes that the 
respondent intended the order for removal of the signs 
to be put into effect quite apart from and independently 
of the action amending the ordinance. This assumes that 
the order was made pursuant to Exhibit "A," the ori-
ginal Section 5720. 
The order, therefore, would be under Subsection (g) 
of Exhibit ''A,'' which contemplates revocation of per-
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mits issued to such persons as ap·plican ts ''at the will 
of the Board of Commissioners thereof whenever said 
board shall deem it to be to the best interest of such 
city ••****." If this language permits the Commission-
ers to revoke a license without reason and ''at will'' 
then it permits arbitrary and capricious action, which 
is considered under point III of this argument. 
Appellants suggest, however, that the words ''when-
ever the Commissioners sha:ll deem it to be to the best 
interest of such city'' contemplate action which is not 
arbitrary and capricious but which is reasonably be-
lieved by the Commissioners to be in the city's best in-
terest. To permit the five of them to act, th·e will of the 
Commissioners must be . expressed, which ~expression 
must indicate that the Commissioners find their action 
to be in the best interest of the city, and by making such 
.a finding or determination the Commissioners will have 
"deemed" the action to be in the city's interest. 
This verb ''deem'' could conceivably refer to an un-
expressed and inarticulate will of the Commissioners; 
but this is not likely since the Commissioners must act 
by resolutions either oral or written, and there is no way 
of determining the will of the Commissioners uniess that 
will is expressed. It must therefore he that the board 
''shall deem'' a certain thing only when they have indi-
cated by their official action that they have "deemed" 
it. The official action of the board in this instance (Ex-
hibit '' D' ') indicates no intention whatever to fur-
ther the best interest of the city and there is no indica-
tion that the best interest of the city was ever consider-
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ed. If the order recited that the \Commissioners ''deem it 
to be in the best interest of the city,'' that order might 
be presumed to stand in the absence of proof of capri-
cious action. In Jackson v. James, 97 Utah 41, 46, 89 Pac. 
2d 23'5, the court considered the meaning of the phrase 
"shall be deemed" and held that it is not intended to 
be mandatory or conclusive when it appears in a legis-
lative enactment but procedural or evidential and sub-
ject to being overcome by contrary evidence. And if used 
in this sense, if the board had deemed the order to be in 
the best interest of the city 1Jy stating that they so re-
garded it, the question would arise which was presented 
in Jackson v. James and as to which l\1r. Justice Wolfe 
dissented and stated that "deem" in that statute should 
be regarded as foreclosing the matter. As applied to this 
case, Jackson v. James would permit a review of the 
determination of the Board of ·Commissioners under the 
majority opinion but not under the dissenting opinion. 
~This vie-\v is consistent with definition of the word 
"deem" in Webster's Unabridged Dictionary as fol-
lows: 
Deem - verb transitive. 
1. To sit in judgment over or upon; to 
judge ; also, to pronounce judgment upon; 
to decide (a case) or give (sentence) ; 
sometimes, specif., to judge adversely; 
2. To conclude or believe on consideration; 
to form a judgment upon; to hold in opin-
ion; to regard; esteem; think. 
3, 4, 5, Not useful. 
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In the interest of reasonable, orderly government 
this court should interpret the language of Subsection 
(g) of Exhibit " .. :\.' · to require the Commissioners to 
make a determination that certain action is in the best 
interest of the city. It is not asking much to require 
that a board go on record that the~~ have deemed certain 
action to be to the best interest of a city and not per-
mit them to take the position, when their own failure 
to make a record is brought before a court, that in the 
backs of their minds the ·Commissioners at all times had 
the best interest of the city as a guiding light and that 
it must therefore be assumed that in taking certain ac-
tion they deemed the action to further such interest. If 
the board deems it to be in the best interest of the city 
they should so say, either by using the word ''deem'' or 
by making a determination or a finding or a statement 
that certain action is in the "best interest of the city. 
III. ASSU~1ING THAT NO FINDING, DETERMIN-
ATION, OR CON'SIDERXTION OF EVIDENCE 
MUST PRECEDE ISSUANCE OF AN ORDER 
OF REMO\l AL, THEN THE O·RDER IS A~;BI­
TRARY, CAPRICIOUS, AND VOID BE·CAUSE 
NOT SUPPORTED BY ANY REASON, LOGIC, 
LAWFUL CLASSIFICATION, OR · LEGITI-
MATE OBJECTIVE. 
Under this point appellants, for the sake of argu-
ment, make further concessions that Subsection (g) of 
Exhibit ''A'' does not require that the Board of Com-
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missioners express anything with reference to the best 
interests of Salt Lake ·City but that all they need to do 
is think it, and although there is no way of determining 
their thoughts except from their expressions, we will 
assume that in this case the Commissioners had the best 
interest of the city in mind. Appellants respectfully urge 
that even on this assumption the Board of Commission-
ers is not entitled to act arbitrarily and capriciously and 
that their action must be reasonable and have some rela-
tion to a legitimate objective to he accomplished. In other 
words, we take the position of Jackson v. James that 
even though the city fathers have deemed something to 
be in the best interests of the city the matter is not con-
cluded by such ''deeming'' and, if it appears plain from 
an examination of the surrounding facts that the action 
was not in the best interests of the city, then the effect 
of the word ''deem'' will have been overcome and the 
action of the Commissioners will have become reversible 
on revie"\v. 
'The complaint alleges that no logical reason, basis, 
or objective exists which would make the action of the 
respondent through its Board of Commissioners sup-
portable; and attempt has ·been made to consider this 
action from the standpoint of all possible legitimate ob-
jectives. If any of those successive points of view mo-
tivated the action then it was ill-conceived, ineffective 
to accomplish the objective, and therefore unreasonable 
and arbitrary. 
Perhaps the court can think up a reason or an ob-
jective whieh would support the action of the Commis-
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further allege that 'vhen the Board of Commissioners 
was asked to state a reason (paragraph 8 of the com-
plaint)) the Commissioners indicated only that they had 
long considered the advisability of revoking the licenses 
dand that it "1'ould be a good thing" and, also, that a 
representative of the Road Commission of Utah had 
mentioned that no signs should be allowed to exist over 
public high,vays. It hardly seems a reason to suggest 
that something '',vould be a good thing'' and even though 
it be admitted that "good" is positive and should be 
encouraged, it hardly seems a sufficient answer to a 
body of taxpayers and citizens which is asking its 
government to support intended action by reason. And 
the other answer given in paragraph 8 of the complaint 
is wholly insufficient because it appears in paragraph 5 
of the complaint that the proposed action of the city 
fathers was ill-adapted and wholly inadequate to carry 
out such direction from the Road Commission of the 
State of Utah. 
It may be conceded that appellants do not have 
what could properly be called a property interest in the 
location of their signs. It is conceded that under Sections 
15-8-11, 23, 26, U.C.A., 1943, the right to regulate the 
portion of the streets where appellants' signs are lo-
cated has been vested in the municipal authorities. Ap-
pellants submit that the same right of regulation exists 
as to signs, awnings, trees, marquees, advertising on 
buses, trucks, and private cars and that regulatory action 
of a municipality with reference to these things cannot 
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be arbitrary, capricious, and unsupported or unsupport-
able by reason. Various courts in a number of cases have 
passed upon comparable problems and have held that 
the position of a licensee is not completely devoid of 
right, that the city's authority in such matters is not 
abso·lute, and that a citizen and licensee or prospective 
licensee has 'the right to require that his municipal leg-
islative body act reasonably in such matters. 
City of Portland v. Yates ( 1921) 199 Pac. 18'4, 186, 
187, 102 Ore. 513, was a criminal case for violation of a 
municipal ordinance. The defendant had erected a sign 
on the street pursuant to a permit, which sign was se-
cure and did not interfere with the use of the street or 
the sidewalk. The city amended the ordinance, making 
minor changes with which defendant's sign did not com-
ply, whereupon the prosecution resulted when the de-
fendant refused to take down his sign. It was held that 
the city was not damaged and that no public need for 
taking the sign down was 1nade to appear and that the 
amended ordinance as applied to defendant's sign was 
invalid. 
"The sign in question in the present case, 
having been erect.ed pursuant to a permit issued 
by the municipal authorities, was not il'legal or a 
nuisance. The question for consideration is whe-
ther or not the change required by the new or-
dinance, prescribing the size and specifications 
for such a sign, tended to promote the public 
health, safety, morals, or welfare. The new ordin-
ance requires a few inches difference in the size 
of the sign, a slight difference in the height from 
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the sidewalk, and a change in the style. It is 
sho'vn by the testimony that the sign in question 
was securely hung. It has been inspected an-
nually. It in no way caused inconvenience to the 
public, and did not interfere with the personal or 
property rights of any person. It cannot be con-
ceiYed that a sign in conformity with the new or-
dinance 'vould tend to promote the health of the 
inhabitants of the city any more than the old one. 
The safety of the public is not claimed to be in 
any \Yay impaired by the sign as now constructed, 
and the new arrangements would not tend toward 
safety. It cannot be claimed that the new require-
ment is in the interest of the morals or general 
welfare of the public. It is not shown and cannot 
be comprehended that there has been any material 
change in the conditions and surroundings of the 
sign since its erection. While the cost of the sign, 
$350, was not great, it having been installed pur-
suant to a regular law of the city, the ru1e adopted 
at the time of its erection became, in a sense, 
a rule of property, and without some reasonable 
cause for the condemnation of the structure it 
should not be held to be unlawful. 
"Every intendment should be made in favor 
of the validity of a municipal law, passed to pro-
mote the public welfare. Yet when it is shown that 
there is no reasonable basis for the adoption of 
the amendatory ordinance, and that the enforce-
ment of the ordinance in the Inanner attempted 
in the present case would be, in effect, a depriva-
tion of property unnecessarily and illegally, the 
court should so construe the enactment as to pre-
vent a wrongful destruction of property. The or-
dinance shouid be upheld and enforced as far as 
it is reasonable, and not to the unreasonable en-
croachment of private rights or property. As to 
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the sign in question, which was already erected 
when the city law was enacted, and is in perfect 
condition, the ordinance is in the nature of an ex 
post facto law. It tends to impair the obligation 
of a contract. The sign in question was not un-
lawful a.t the time it was erected. It has not been 
made so by any valid enactment of the legislative 
department of the city." 
In Pickrell v. Carlisle, 135 Ky. 128, 131, 121 S. W. 
1029, the plaintiff sought an injunction to restrain the 
town from interfering with the placing of steps in front 
of his house which woulld encroach upon the sidewalk 
at that point. The court of appeals reversed the trial 
court and held that the injunction should issue because 
the encroachment was not unreasonable in view of all 
circumstances, saying: 
"It is old and familiar law that the streets, 
including the pavements of ·a to,vn, belong to the 
municipality for the use of the public traveling 
upon them for their \vhole length and width; like-
wise, that any per1nanent structure built upon any 
part of the public streets so far as to interfere 
with their use by the public for travel may be per 
se a nuisance, and n1ay be abated by the n1unici-
pality, or be abated by the courts at the instance 
of the town. But it is not true that the municipal-
ity and the traveling public have the right to the 
exclusive use of the public streets. The owners of 
abutting lots have rights in the streets in addi-
tion to those enjoyed by the general public, and 
it may be in spite of their rig-hts, for example, 
the abutting owner has a particular easernent in 
the street in1mediately fronting his lot, or leading 
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to it, of ingress or egress, to a not unreasonable 
extent, a·lthough the exercise of his right might 
interfere \Yith the public use. If it were not so, 
then to"~ns could not exist, for the title to the 
street would in effect, or could, absorb the value 
of the abutting lot as a city lot. This right of in-
gress and egress must be exercised in a reason-
able 1nanner, so as to interfere not excessively 
\Yith the public right of travel.******* 'The dom-
inant idea of the common law is ''reasonable-
ness.'' Neither the city nor the abutting lot owner 
is allowed to act the dog in the manger-at least 
there \Yill be given the aid of a court of equity 
in so acting. It is therefore that a lot owner is 
confined to a reasonable use of his right of in-
gress, and egress, of ornamentation of his lot and 
the street in front of it (as by planting and main-
taining shade trees, awnings, lamp posts, and the 
like), and the city and public will not be heard in 
equity to complain of the abutting owner's act 
\vhich does not unreasonably interfere with the 
public's use of the street for travel." 
Chicago Park District v. Canfield (1943), 382 Iii. 
218, 223, 224, 47 N. E. 2d 61, involved an ordinance of 
the City of Chicago which provided that no person shall 
operate any vehicle, display any placard notice or ad-
vertisement in any park or on any public way within the 
park district. There were then five specific exceptions, 
the fifth of which \\ras the basis of holding the ordinance 
invalid. 
• 'By the fifth exception it is provided that 
the ordinance shall not apply to common carriers 
and taxicabs. This brings us to the second ques-
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tion, viz : Does not the exception of common car-
riers and taxicabs from the operation of the or-
dinance render it invalid~ In determining this 
question we must keep in mind that a regulation 
of this kind can be sustained, only if it promotes 
and protects the public welfare and has a defin-
ite reiation thereto. It must contain some element 
connected with t-he safety of traffic. It can be sus-
tained only on the ground that it promotes the 
safety of public travel and the use of the park and 
'park system. Such advertising can only be pro-
hibited on the ground that it tends to distract the 
attention of drivers, or others, in such manner 
and to the extent that it slows up or congests traf-
fic or increases traffic hazards.****** The Park 
District has been expressly authorized to enact 
traffic regulations in the parks and on the boule-
vards under its jurisdiction. This power is sub-
ject only to the limitation that such power must 
be exercised for the promotion of public health, 
safety, morals, or general welfare, in accordance 
with the purposes for which the Park District is 
organized. If a regulation falls within this classi-
fication it is no objection to its validity that it 
may also promote aesthetic purposes if its rea-
sonableness niay be sus~ained on other grounds. 
N eef v. ·City of Springfield, 380 Ill. 275. 
"It is apparent, however, that the ordinance 
here involved creates an unlawful classification, 
discriminatory in its nature, which renders the 
ordinance invalid. The fifth exception provides 
in substance that the regulation shall not apply 
to common carriers and taxicabs. There is no rea-
sonable ground upon which this classification can 
be made. It bears no relation to the object and 
purposes of the ordinance.'' 
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French v. Cooper (1945 ), 133 N. J. L. 246, 34 Atl. 
880. The plaintiff applied for a building permit to con-
struct an awning which was refused under a section of 
the zoning ordinance of Ocean ·City prohibiting metal, 
wood, or cloth awnings extending more than five feet 
from any main building wall or less than seven feet 
above the sidewalk and prohibiting support from or by 
any post, fixture or device resting on or attached to any 
street or board walk. The court held the ordinance in-
valid and that plaintiff was entitled to his permit, say-
Ing: 
''It is settled that a municipality has no 
po,ver to limit the use to which property may be 
put unless the regulation is designed to promote 
public health, safety and general welfare. Durkin 
Lumber Company v. Fitzsimmons, 196 N. J. L. 
183. \\T e fail to see in what respect the erection 
of this a\vning can adversely affect public health, 
safety or general welfare. The absence of a brief 
on behalf of respondent suggests that they, ton, 
experience the same quandry. The fact that near-
by property owners have expressed themselves 
as favoring the proposed erection and that none 
objects, weighs against the reasonableness of the 
decision to refuse the permit.'' 
Brahan v. Meridian Home Telephone Co., 97 Miss. 
325, 6'2 Southern 485, 486, was a suit for damages for 
destruction of trees brought against the telephone com-
pany. The defendant obtained a directed verdict which 
was reversed and remanded for new trial on appeal. 
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'':The ownership of trees between the side-
walk and the street is as sacred as any other pro-
perty right. Of course, the paramount purpose of 
sidewalks and the streets is for a public use as 
such, and when trees obstruct the free use of the 
street the city undoubtedly has the power to carry 
out the paramount purpose, and to remove or 
destroy the trees, if such action be necessary to 
·complete its use to the public; but this power 
belongs alone to the city, and can he exercised 
only when it seeks to make the street or sidewalk 
useful for its legitimate purposes.'' 
City of Mt. Carmel v. Shaw~ 52 Ill. App. 429, 435, 
436, likewise invo~lved shade trees. The city council pass-
ed an ordinance narrowing the width of streets by donat-
ing two feet on each side to the property owners and 
by establishing sidewalk space for six feet adjoining that 
two feet, requiring removal of trees in the sidewalk area. 
The appellees brought suit to enjoin destruction of valu-
able shade trees alleging that there was sufficient room 
in the street area to build sidewalks without damage to 
the trees and that destroying them would result in irre-
parable damages to the lot owners as weU as the public. 
A writ of injunction was issued which was sustained on 
.appeal with one modification. The court said: 
''Shade trees standing just within the curb-
ing of a sidev•1alk in a street do not constitute a 
nuisance, and the city may be enjoined from de-
stroying then1. 
'' 'Vhile the decree of the court enjoining the 
city from destroying the trees will he affirrned, 
it will have to be modified. The injunction is per-
, 
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petual. Conditions may so change, that in time 
public interest may require that the sidewalk 
should be mueh wider than six feet; should this 
property hy the growth of the city become a busi-
ness part, then a sidewalk might be required of 
twelve feet in width. In such case, the trees would 
be an obstruction to trave'l, and the city would 
have a rig·ht to remove them when they became 
so.'' 
Sproul v. Stockton, 73 N. J. L. 158, 160, 62 Atl. 275, 
is a similar case involving shade trees. 
In City of Yale v. Davenport (Okl. 1936), 54 P. 2d, 
335, the court held void an ordinance requiring a permit 
to move a house across or along a street upon plaintiff's 
suit to have the ordinance declared invalid. The ordi-
nance had some provisions reasonably related to safety 
and convenience and regulation of traffic and had other 
provisions not so related, including one that no house 
could be moved unless specia:l assessments on the pro-
perty had been paid. The court said : 
''Under certain provisions of this ordinance, 
the court was justified in finding that its adopt-
ed regulation had nothing to do with protection 
of the streets or their use.'' 
In Bueneman v. Santa Barbara, 8 Cal. 2d 405, 65 
P. 2d 884, 109 A. L. R. 89.5, it was held that a license tax 
on laundries making distributions in the city but not hav-
ing plants in the city was arbitrary, discriminatory, and 
void as against a laundry which distributed in the city 
and had its plant located outside the city. 
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In Lewis v. Pingree National Bank, 47 Utah 35, at 
p;ages 45, 46, 4 7, 52, 53, 151 Pac. 558, the court passed 
on the right of a private citizen to enjoin as constituting 
a public nuisance the continued use of a bank front which 
protruded onto the sidewalk and was a portion of the 
public street. The court held it had ample authority to 
enjoin the continued use of this bank front, but felt con-
strained to consider the need of the public and balance 
that against private interests in determining whether 
the bank front should be allowed to remain. The court 
thus indicated its views on the factors determining whe-
ther the encroachment should remain, indicating that 
reasonable encroachments are to be permitted. 
''There is nothing in any of the cases, there-
fore, which necessarily requires the removal of 
the front of defendant's bank building under the 
undisputed facts and circumstances of the case at 
bar, although it be conceded that projecting the 
front into the street constitutes a public nuisance 
which the courts have full power to abate, and it 
be further conceded that the plain tiff's property 
is substantially damaged by the pillar next to the 
show window in his store building. The reai ques-
tion to ·be determined, therefore, is whether in this 
case a court of equity should exercise its full 
power in requiring the removal of the nuisance 
******** 
''Here we have a case where the street is of 
the generous width of 132 feet from lot line to 
lot line, twenty feet of which on either side is 
devoted to a concrete sidewalk for pedestrians. 
The public, therefore, in the nature of things, 
cannot be inconvenienced to any great extent by 
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an obstructed passageway********. 
~':Further, the evidence is to the effect that 
the front of the building as now constructed is an 
ornament to any city, and to now tear down and 
remodel it will entail an expenditure of at least 
$15,000, and, as we have seen, the architect says 
that even then the building will not answer the 
purposes for which it was planned and design-
ed********. 
"If, therefore, a tenant, or the owner, for 
that matter, in the second story of an adjoining 
building, wants to look down upon the street or 
side,valk, his view will be interfered with and ob-
structed by plaintiff's projecting awning. This, 
however, is not such an impairment of the use-
fulness of a building as the law can recognize. 
If such were the case, .all awnings, signs, and 
other obstructions would have to he removed. No 
appreciable or substantial damage can result 
from the mere projection of defendant's cornice 
into the street********. 
'• The Legislature, and, when du'ly authorized 
by the Legislature, cities and towns may to some 
extent, at least, authorize encroachment on public 
streets; but they may do that only to a reason-
able extent, and then only subject to the right of 
any aggrieved person to sue and recover such 
damages as he may sustain by the encroachment.'' 
The Supreme Court indicated res'pect for the same· 
considerations in Salt Lake ·City v. Schubach, 108 Utah 
266, 159 P. 2d 149. That case was a suit for damages 
brought by a woman who tripped over a trap door in a 
sidewalk of Salt Lake City and the appeal involved de-
termination of who was responsible for the defect. On 
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pages 272-3 of 108 Utah, the court noted that abutting 
owners do not have an absolute right to make openings 
in the sidewalk for their con¥enience ; but the court said: 
''The legislature may, however, authorize 
such limited use of the sidewalks for the more 
convenient and beneficial use of the adjacent pro-
perty. ('Citing cases). Such s·pecial privileges or 
rights are justified as in the public interest by 
increasing business facilities, improving and 
making practicable better buildings and improve-
ments on the property and adding to the taxable 
value. (Citing cases). The legislative power to 
permit such use of the sidewalks has been dele-
gated to the municipalities. This follows from the 
grant to the cities of control over the streets and 
sidewalks." Sees. 15-8-23 and 15-8-11, U. C. A. 
1943. 
The Schubach case stated the following limitation 
on authority of the cities to permit use of sidewalks by 
private individuals : 
''It seems to us that the Cohn case and those 
following it, what we shall call the IllinoiR line of 
cases, overlook one fundamental essential to a 
sound rule of liability in this situation, namely: 
The fact that the sidewalks are part of the public 
highway, dedicated to use by the public, and the 
municipal corporations have no right or authority 
to grant individuals the use thereof which would 
in any way interfere with the use by the public. 
(Brough v. Ute Stampede Ass'n., 105 Utah 446, 
142 P. 2d 670). However, a properly constructed 
coal hole, grating, or vault light, kept in good re-
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pair, does not interfere with such use in any way, 
so that the municipal corp·oration may grant abut-
ting landowners the right to make such use of the 
sidewalk; but only, however, on condition that 
the owner of the abutting property properly con-
struct the grate, coal hole, or vault light, and that 
he maintain such structure in such condition that 
the public may safely use the sidewalks there-
over.'' 
The subject is discussed generally by McQuillin, 
~funicipal Corporations, 2d Ed., in Sections 986, 1438, 
and 1453, as follows : 
''BILLBOARDS AND STR.UCTURES FOR 
ADVERTISING. To promote the public safety, 
convenience, comfort, morals and welfare of the 
inhabitants, the police power, to regulate the use 
of streets and public ways, confers ample author-
ity to enact and enforce, by ordinance, reasonable 
and nondiscriminatory regulations, general and 
uniform in their nature, respecting the erection 
and maintenance of billboards and other struc-
tures used for advertising purposes and placed at 
or near the street lines. Such regulations are sal-
utary and necessary, are not in restraint of trade, 
nor unlawful restrictions upon the legal and bene-
ficial use of property. 'The general welfare clause, 
it has been held, will support necessary, reason-
able and uniform regUlations. But aesthetic con-
sideration alone, it is generally held, will not 
sanction unreasonable restrictions relating to the 
erection and maintenance of such structures." 
(Section 986). 
''Another point to be considered is whether 
the encroachment is on the surface of the street 
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or is above or below the surface. Much greater 
latitude is generally conferred on the municipality 
in regard to encroachment above or below the sur-
face of the street, and the reason is clearly appar-
ent, since ordinarily, minor encroachments above 
the surface such as bay windows, awnings, and 
the 'like, or below the surface, do not in any way 
obstruct the use of the street and sidewalk for 
travel' or interfere therewith. 
''The general rule is that a municipality may 
require the removal of an obstruction on a street 
notwithstanding there is still ample room left for 
passage of teams and travelers. On the contrary, 
it is held in some cases that the mere partial ob-
struction of a street, when as a rna tter of fact 
such obstruction does not interfere with the public 
use, is not a nuisance." (Section 1438). 
''On the theory that the use of the street is 
for public and not private use·, strictly speaking 
it would seem that, unless expressiy authorized, 
an abutting owner has no absolute right to put 
up awnings or signs projecting over the sidewalk 
or to build bay or oriel windows -extending into 
the street or to attach anything to his building 
which projects beyond the street line, and such 
projections are sometimes expressly forbidden by 
city ordinance. Such ordinances are clearly valid. 
On the other hand, an awning erected over the 
sidewalk is not necessarily a public nuisance per 
se. Such structures are so common as to he almost 
universal, and, unless prohibited by ordinance, 
they are a'lmost invariably permitted unless, as 
an actual matter of fact, they become dangerous 
or annoying to pedestrians. However, it has 
been held that certain kinds, at least, Inay be pro-
hibited in the exercise of municipal police power, 
and it is well settled that they may be well regu-
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lated and a permit required, although not as a 
matter of fact dangerous or annoying to pedes-
trians or others.'' (Section 1453). 
See, also, State v. Higgs (1900), 126 N.C. 1014, 1023, 
1024, 1025, 35 S. E. ±73, (ordinance held invalid which 
prohibited hanging signs without regard to danger; over-
ruled in part by Small v. Edington, 146 N. C. 527, 60 
S. E. ±13) ; People ex rel Wineburgh Advertising Com-
pany v. ~Iurphy (1909), 195 N. Y. 126, 129, 130, 131, 132-
133, 135, 88 N. E. 17, 21 L. R. A. (NS) 735, where an or-
dinance reh~ting to sky signs was held discriminatory 
as unrelated to safety, health, or n1orals; Laura Vincent 
Co. v. City of Selma, 43 Cal. App. 473, 11 P. 2d 17, (reg-
ulation of a"·nings must have reasonable relation to the 
public safety or convenience); Ivins v. Trenton, 68 N. J. 
L. 501, 502, 503, 504, 53 Atl. 202; State v. Wong Ring, 
176 ~Iinn. 151, 222 N. W. 639, which discusses the bases 
upon which an ordinance regulating awnings over side-
walks can be upheld; Mallory, Inc., v. City of New Ro-
chelle, 53 N. Y. S. 2d 643, sustaining ordinance prohibit-
ing all signs extending over the sidewalks except for 
marquees of theaters, hotels, or public buildings with ra-
tionalization of its classification. 
It therefore appears that licensees and permittees 
who are using the streets or a portion of space over the 
streets or sidewalks for a private purpose are not alto-
gether without rights and that ordinances regulating 
such uses or prohibiting such uses in part (which is 
really a regulation) must be reasonable and based upon 
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distinctions and reasons which have substance. There is 
no power in municipalities to regulate streets and the 
use thereof arbitrarily, capriciously, and un.reasonably. 
;Therefore, quite apart from procedural questions in-
volved, and assuming that no formal order is required 
it still appears that the action of the Board of Commis-
sioners of respondent is unlawful and arbitrary and 
should not be allowed to stand. If the city has a defense 
to the charges made by the allegations of the complaint, 
it should be required to prove that the allegations are 
erroneous. 
IV. SECTION 5720, REVISED ORDINANCES OF, 
SALT LAKE CITY, 1944, IS VOID BECAUSE 
IT CONTAINS NO STANDARD OR RULE ·TO 
GUIDE THE BO·ARD OF COMMISSIO·NERS 
OR :THE PUBLIC IN THE MATTER OF RE-
MOVAL OF LICENSED SIGNS. 
Under this point of our argument appellants res-
pectfully urge and contend that the power conferred on 
respondent by the Utah Legislatur~ requires not only 
reasonable exercise but that if the respondent sets up by 
ordinance the regulation which will govern use of the 
streets and sidewalks then that ordinance must have a 
reasonable basis, must indicate how the problem will be 
handled by the city and give a criterion or standard 
which is usable by reasonable citizens. 
The provision in Section 5720 of the ordinances ·es-
tablishing as the only criterion that an act shall be ''in 
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the best interest of the city'' is so vague and general 
as to be useless and does not meet the requirements for 
such an ordinance as laid down by the authorities. 
On the other hand, Exhibit '' E '' is Section 5731 of 
the Salt Lake ·City ordinances and regulates signs above, 
over or in the streets and is pursuant to Section 15-7-26, 
U. C . ..._:\.., 19-!3. This ordinance is the one which, appel-
lants contend, should have been applied to ap·pellants. 
It provides a reasonable standard to guide respondent 
and citizens in the removal of signs : 
''If any sign be found by the bureau of me-
chanical inspection to be unsafe or dangerous, the 
same shall be forthwith repaired and rendered 
safe by the owner thereof or the person main-
taining and controiling it;********.'' 
This is a standard which is understandable and sus-
ceptible of good administration. It lets pe-rmittees know 
what is required of them. 
In 37 Am. Jur., page 778, the gene-ral rule is thu~ 
stated: 
• 'In accordance with settled principles that 
no American legislative body can constitutionally 
and validly delegate to administrative officers an 
exercise of discretionary power which is arbi-
trary, it is established that any n1unicipal ordin-
ance which vests an arbitrary discretion in pub-
lic administrative officia'ls with reference to the 
rights, property, or business of individuals, with-
out prescribing a uniform rule of action, making 
the enjoyment of such rights depend upon arbi-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
44 
trary choice of the officers without reference to 
all persons of the class to which the ordinance 
is. intended to be applicable, and without furnish-
ing any definite standard for the control of the 
officers, is unconstitutional, void, and beyond the 
powers of a municipality.'' 
In Cicero Lumbe·r Co. v. 'Town of Cicero, 176 Ill. 
9, 51 N. E. 758, 42 L. R. A. 676, ·68 Am. St. Rep·. 155,: thte 
plaintiff obtained an injunction against town offi~ials' en-
forcing an ordinance which invalidly gave them uncon-
tro~led discretion to permit other than pleasure vehicles 
on those streets from which such vehicles were otherwise 
excluded. 'The ordinance excluded traffic other than for 
pleasure purposes ''except private wagons conveying 
families, or upon special permission of this board." In 
holding the ordinance void because not indicating stan-
dards upon which permission would be granted, the court 
said at page 765 of 51 N. E.: 
''In other words, the discretion is lodged with 
the board of trustees to permit or not to permit 
traffic vehicles to be used upon the boulevards 
in question. The ordinance, in so far as it invests 
the board of trustees with the discretion here in-
dicated, is unreasonable. It prohibits that which is 
in itself, and as a general thing, perfectly lawful, 
and leaves the power of permitting or forbidding 
the use of traffic teams upon the boulevards to an 
unregulated official discretion, when the whole 
matter should be regulated by permanent local 
provisions operating generally and impartially.'' 
'State v. Coleman (1921), 133 Atl. 385, 387, 96 Conn. 
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190, held an ordinance invalid which prohibited speech 
making in the public square ''without first obtaining a 
permit from the chief of poiice." On this point the court 
held: 
~~The only effective way of protecting the 
citizen against the abuse of an unlimited discre-
tion is to declare void any grant of an unlimited 
discretion to control the exercise of privileges 
"Thich all citizens have a common right to enjoy 
on equal terms.'' 
Rizzo v. Douglas (192'3), 201 N.Y. S. 194, upheld an 
ordinance making it unlawful to drive a taxicab without 
obtaining a license, pointing out the definite guides that 
were laid down to control the official discretion and ap-
plicants for licenses, and holding at page 196 that with-
out such guides the ordinance would be void. 
In People v. Rathje, 33 Ill. 304, 164 N. E. 696, at 
page 698 the court said: 
"Unlimited power, to be exercised in accord-
ance with the whim or caprice of public officials, 
is inconsistent with our systen1 of government.'' 
Village of Granville v. Krouse, 228 N. Y. S. 204, 
holds a municipal! building code void for failure to es-
tablish standards. 
City of New Orleans v. Palmisano (1920), 83 South-
ern 789, 146 La. 518, holds void an ordinance regulating 
portable gas tanks on the ground that it vested arbitrary 
power in the commission where the ordinance required 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
46 
a permit from the commission before pulling a portable 
gas tank in the city. 
And likewise, in City of New Orleans v. B'odie, 83 
Southern 826, 146 La. 550, an ordinance provided that 
no taxicab would be allowed on the streets of the city 
"w~thout an official permit from the department of pub-
lic safety." The court heid that such an ordinance was 
void since it conferred arbitrary power on the depart-
ment of public safety ''without some uniform system by 
which all in the same class may avail themselves thereof 
by complying with the regulations so imposed.'' It was 
observed that the city could lawfully prohibit all taxi-
cabs on the streets but that if any were permitted it 
must be on a reasonable basis. 
In Breinig v. County of Allegheny, 332 Pa. 474, 482, 
483, 2 Atl. 2d 842, 848, 849, the plaintiffs had received 
a permit to cut the curb for a private driveway to their 
place of business, which permit was revoked before the 
driveway was finished. The court held that this was too 
drastic and that the authorities had not properly con-
ceived the requirement of balancing the needs of the 
public and the needs of the plaintiffs, saying: 
''But the public authorities have the un-
doubted right to regulate the manner of the use 
of driveways by adopting such rules and regula-
tions, in the interest of public safety, as will 
award some measure of access and yet permit 
public travell with a minimum of danger. The 
rules and regulations must be reasonable, strik-
ing a balance between the public and the private 
interest. ******** 
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"We agree vvith the court below that the ac-
tion of appellants was unreasonable and oppres-
sive. The circumstances did not require an abso-
lute prohibition of drivevvays to appellees' pro-
perty.'' 
Livingston v. \V olf, et al., 136 Pa. 519, 20 Am. St. 
Rep. 936, 20 .A.tl. 551, 552. This was a suit by a property 
owner to enjoin construction of a bay window which 
would jut into the street 27¥2 inches in front of the house 
of defendant, plaintiff's neighbor. ·The city had an ordin-
ance prohibiting ''any jut or blrlk window projecting 
into the street more than 28 inches." The court held that 
cities have the right to regulate streets and sidewalks 
and encroachn1ents thereon and that the regulation was 
reasonable, and as to the extent of the power to regulate 
streets and sidewalks the court stated : 
"The foot . ways no less than the carriage 
ways are under municipal control, and the au-
thorities may determine the extent to which the 
walks and pavements may be obstructed by cellar 
doors, doorsteps, awnings, projecting windows, 
cornices, and the like. This power must he exer-
cised by regulations that are general and uni-
form; that are reasonable and certain; and that 
are in conformity with the constitution and laws. 
When so exercised it is binding on a'll the inhabi-
tants of the municipality. These general proposi-
tions are supported by many cases********. That 
the eourts must judge of the reasonableness of 
the action of the municipality, and that such ac-
tion is not binding, if it is unreasonable, was held 
1n Knudler v. Norris town, 100 Pa. St. 368, and 
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that its action must be general, bearing equally 
upon the citizens, was ruled in Reimer's appeal, 
100 Pa. St. 182." 
In Ex Parte 'Tomlinson, 54 Okl. Cr. 367, 22 P. 2d 
398, 400, an ordinance was held invalid which required 
owners of ambulances, before making any trip in the 
city, to call the police station and obtain permission to 
re~pond to the call, the ordinance proviq.ing that the first 
one to call would be authorized to niake the trip. This 
was held to be arbitrary, unreasonable,· and discrimina-
tory, the court saying: 
''This. court has been extremely liberal in its 
interpretation of police power of 1nunicipalities, 
but the effect of the ordinance in question is to 
carry such regulations to an absurd, unjustifiable, 
and unreasonable extreme, and beyond the police 
'power of the city. The administration of the or-
dinance in question is left entire'ly to the radio 
dispatcher, and, if that radio dispatcher should 
see fit to favor a certain funeral home, whether 
for profit, friendship, or because of malice toward 
others, it would be easy for him to do so. It mat-
ters not how· urgent the emergency call, under 
the terms of this ordinance the owner of the am-
bulance cannot answer without being subjected 
to a fine, unless he first secured permission of 
the radio dispatcher to make the call.'' 
''Under the police power of the city it has 
the right to regulate the use of its streets in a 
reasonable manner by prohibiting reckless driv-
ing, establishing stop lines, and prohibiting un-
due noises and other things of like character, but 
the city may not in the exercise of its po'lice power 
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place arbitrary, unreasonable, and discriminatory 
reg·ulations upon any business.'' 
People ex rel. Schimpff v. Norvell, et al., 368 Iil. 
325, 13 N·. E. 2d 960, 961, was a writ of mandamus to 
con1pel issuance of a building permit under an ordin-
ance forbidding buildings except where its p,rincip·al 
frontage "\vas ''upon a street or officially ap;proved 
place,'' as required by the ordinance. The court held 
this ordinance invalid as conferring unlimited discre-
tion: 
''Any ordinance which invests arbitrary pow-
er in a public official which may be used in the 
interests of some to the exclusion of others is 
unreasonable and void. Cicero Lumber Co. v. 
Town of Cicero, 176 Ill. 9, 51 N. E. 758, 42 L. R. 
A. 696, 68 Am. St. Rep. 155; City of Chicago v. 
Trotter, 136 Ill. 430, 26 N. E. 359. The ordinance 
before us prescribes no conditions or terms upon 
which the commissioner of buildings is to· deter-
mine what shall be an ''officially approved 
place.'' In this respect his action is neither con-
trolled, limited, nor guided by any rules, defini-
tions, or requirements in the ordinance. So far as 
that enactment is concerned, he is I eft free to ap-
prove a private way proposed by one citizen while 
disapproving a similar one for someone else." 
Annotations at 12 A. L. R. 1435 and 54 A. L. R. 
1104 point out that statutes or ordinances cannot vest 
discretion in a public official or body without establish-
ing standards to guide them and the public. The·se anno-
tations note an exception where mere privileges are in-
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volved in such prohibitable businesses as selling liquor, 
operating pool rooms or public dance halls. In this type 
of case the discretion may be more broad than in other 
types of cases. These annotations also point out a dis-
tinction where immediate action wrll be required and 
where the circumstances which may be controlling are 
too numerous and too difficult to classify. :The annotator 
refers to Eureka ·City v. Wilson, 15 Utah 53, 48 Pac. 41, 
aflfirmed 173 (U. S. 32, 43 L. Ed. 603, 19 ·S. 'Ct. 317, as 
such a case. That case holds that a city may prohibit the 
moving of houses on streets of the city and also that 
it may 'prohibit such acts conditionally and confer on a 
municipal official the power to dete-rmine whether a 
permit shall be gran ted in a particular case. This court 
held that such use of the streets is extraordinary and 
permissive and that no standards need be set up as it 
will be assumed that the discretion will not be abused. 
·This case is an exception to the general rule and 
makes plain the .position of appellants and their right 
to complain of this ordinance. It is plain from the num-
ber of appellants and from the complaint (Par. 8) that 
the city has granted permits for curb signs over a num-
ber of years' time, thus indicating that there is nothing 
extraordinary about such use. Discretion of the Colnmis-
sioners has been exercised with reference to these per-
mits and, as indicated in City of Portland v. Yates 
(sup:ra) and Breinig v. County of Allegheny (supra), the 
fact of continued use has given a sort of vested right in 
these appellants. Our case is therefore far removed from 
the Eureka City case and there is no case here for un-
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controiled discretion in the Board of Commissioners. 
The ordinanee, requiring no standard or rule of con-
duct other than it be in the "best interest of the city" 
and ""'"hich may mean anything or nothing, does not fall 
within the exception to the general rule. 
The danger of such uncontrolled authorjty with no 
directions or standards to guide either the Commission-
ers or the public is plain from the facts of this case. In 
and upon the streets of Salt Lake City there are innum-
erable signs, marquees, trees, utility poles, signs on 
trucks, signs on buses, advertisements "from sound 
trucks, advertising clocks, and a theatre sign across the 
street, elevators, delivery chutes, sidewalk basements, 
all of '"hich constitute uses for the benefit of abutting 
owners (except the signs on buses, trucks, and sound 
trucks) and all of which involve use of the street for a 
business purpose. In the face of all of these uses, and 
without effort to classify such us_es or the reason for 
dicriminating against curb signs of these appellants, 
Section 5720 would permit the Commissioners to revoke 
the permits of appellants when they find it to be in the 
city's best interest without indicating why it is so or 
against what the signs of appellants offend where all of 
the ·multifarious uses referred to do not offend. 
Perhaps some signs should be removed as being 
unsafe, unattractive, offensive to adjoining property 
owners, or as be~ng generaily run down. Any reason-
able rules of the city with reference thereto could be 
applied hy appellants and could be adhered ~o by the 
city. But under the present ordinance the Board of 
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Commissioners for a number of years permits erection 
of these signs in a manner which is presumably carry-
ing out the best jnterests of the city and then, without 
rhyme nor reason ascertainable to appellants, decides 
that the best interest of the city has become different 
and now requires removal of the signs. Such uncontrolled 
power should not be permitted. 
CONCLUSION 
The lower court erred in sustaining the general de-
murrer and respondent should be required to disprove 
the a'llegations of the com·plaint or else take lawful meas-
ures by ordinance to regulate use of the streets for ad-
vertising. 
The threatened action of respondent is at best pre-
mature. Exhibit "D" contemplates amendment of Sec-
tion 5720 of the Ordinances before curb signs shall be 
removed thereunder. And should the court hold that 
respondent intended removal of the signs under Sec-
tion 5720 without amendment then it should follow that 
there has been no finding or determination that the best 
interest of the city will be subserved by removal of ap-
pellants' signs. And in any event, respondent has acted 
arbitrarily, capriciously, and has discriminated against 
appellants. And lastly, Section 5720 vests too broad au-
thority and uncontrolled discretion in the Board of Com-
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missioners and is therefore void for want of standards 
or guides. The case should be remanded for further pro-
ceedings. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RIC:HARDS AND BIRD 
Attorneys for Appellatnt,s. 
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